Saudi Arabia stopped participating in Project mBridge in May 2025, more than a year before the withdrawal became public.
The Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) told the Financial Times that it successfully completed its mBridge proof of concept on 13 May 2025 and was no longer a participating member thereafter. SAMA said this was in accordance with its original plan and cautioned against drawing broader conclusions from the decision. [1]
That distinction matters. Saudi Arabia did not withdraw from mBridge in September 2026. What changed on 20 September was the market’s knowledge of an exit that had occurred sixteen months earlier.
A China-led project with multilateral origins. The Financial Times describes mBridge as China-led. The description captures an important strategic dimension, but the project’s institutional origins are broader. mBridge grew from earlier Hong Kong–Thailand experimentation and was subsequently developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub Hong Kong Centre, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Thailand, Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates and the Digital Currency Institute of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). [2]
Saudi Arabia joined as a full participant when mBridge reached minimum viable product stage in June 2024. The platform was designed to allow participating central and commercial banks to conduct direct cross-border payments and foreign-exchange transactions using wholesale central-bank digital currencies on a shared distributed-ledger platform. [2]
The BIS subsequently ended its own participation in October 2024, saying the project had progressed far enough for the central-bank partners to carry it forward. The BIS explicitly said its departure was not because the project had failed and was not politically motivated. [3]
Why the infrastructure matters. Conventional cross-border payments often pass through chains of correspondent banks, with separate messaging, funding and settlement processes. A multi-central-bank digital-currency platform could allow participating institutions to transact more directly and potentially reduce settlement time, cost and intermediary balance-sheet requirements.
That gives mBridge a geopolitical dimension as well as an operational one. A platform capable of settling transactions without using the U.S. dollar as an intermediary currency could, if it reached sufficient scale, reduce dependence on parts of today’s dollar-centred cross-border financial architecture. The Financial Times reports that this potential has attracted scrutiny in Washington. [1]
But mBridge should not simply be described as a replacement for SWIFT. SWIFT primarily provides financial messaging; mBridge combines payment and settlement functionality using central-bank digital currencies. The strategic overlap lies in potentially changing the infrastructure through which cross-border transactions are instructed, funded and settled.
Nor does the Saudi withdrawal establish that Riyadh rejected that model. SAMA says its proof of concept ended as planned. There is no verified evidence that U.S. pressure caused the withdrawal, that Saudi Arabia abandoned renminbi settlement, or that it is retreating from central-bank digital-currency research.
The project itself has continued. Saudi Arabia’s departure should not be read as the end of mBridge. The Monetary Authority of Macao joined the platform in early 2026 and formally opened the system to Macao banks on 2 June. On the first day, three banks completed 23 cross-border transactions worth nearly MOP1.3 billion, involving mainland China, Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates. [4]
That creates a more nuanced picture: a major Group of Twenty economy and oil exporter quietly ended formal participation, while the China-led platform itself continued to expand elsewhere.
The development matters to the remaining mBridge central banks and participating commercial banks, correspondent banks, treasury and foreign-exchange teams, payment-system operators, regulators and institutions assessing whether wholesale central-bank digital currency can support scalable cross-border settlement.
FMI WORLD analysis: Cross-border financial infrastructure derives strategic value from network participation as much as from technology. Saudi Arabia sits at the intersection of U.S. financial relationships, Chinese trade links and Gulf capital flows. Its departure therefore reduces mBridge’s known geographic and economic reach.
But the more important question is what happens next. If mBridge moves from experimentation toward sustained commercial activity, its significance will depend on the central banks and commercial banks that remain connected, the currencies and corridors they support, actual transaction volumes, and whether the platform can deliver legal finality, liquidity efficiency and interoperability at scale.
Saudi Arabia’s exit is therefore neither evidence that mBridge has failed nor proof of a geopolitical realignment. It is an important change in the membership of a China-led attempt to build a new layer of cross-border central-bank-money settlement infrastructure.
Watch next — The current mBridge governance and membership structure; Macao’s production activity; participating commercial banks and payment corridors; transaction volumes; the role of the digital renminbi; interoperability with domestic payment systems; and any alternative Saudi wholesale-CBDC or cross-border settlement initiatives.
Sources and references
[1] Financial Times — Saudi Arabia quits China-led cross-border currency platform (20 September 2026).
[2] Bank for International Settlements — Project mBridge reaches minimum viable product stage (5 June 2024).
[3] Bank for International Settlements — The future of finance (31 October 2024).
[4] Monetary Authority of Macao — first day of mBridge participation (3 June 2026).
FMI WORLD NEWSROOM story reference: FMIF-20260920-001.